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Child Support Enforcement and Fathers’ Contributions to Their Nonmarital Children 
 
 
Research shows that stronger child support enforcement increases the amount of formal support 
received by children from their nonresident fathers. Yet, little is known about: 1) the informal 
cash and non-cash contributions that nonresident fathers make—especially to nonmarital 
children, 2) the effect of child support enforcement on these types of contributions, and 3) most 
importantly, the effect of child support enforcement on total (formal plus informal) child support 
contributions. Using data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, we find that 
strong enforcement reduces the amount of informal support, increases the amount of formal 
support, and most importantly, has no effect on the total amount of support received by unwed 
mothers. The effects on total payments are negative for parents who stopped cohabiting recently 
and positive for parents who never cohabited or stopped cohabiting three or more years ago. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Research from the last two decades has shown that stronger child support enforcement increases 
the amount of formal support received by children from their nonresident fathers
1. Yet, little is 
known from quantitative research about: 1) the magnitude of informal cash and non-cash 
contributions that nonresident fathers make—especially to nonmarital children, 2) the magnitude 
of the effect of child support enforcement on these types of contributions, and 3) most 
importantly, the effect of child support enforcement on total (formal plus informal) child support 
contributions. Some qualitative research suggests that informal child support payments are quite 
common among unwed and low income nonresident fathers and that strong child support 
enforcement leads to substitution of formal for informal support.  
Today, over 1/3 of all births and nearly 70% of black births are to unmarried mothers 
(Hamilton et al. 2005), who are more likely to be poor and are less likely to receive formal child 
support than are previously married mothers (U.S. Census Bureau 2004, 2006). Informal and 
non-cash contributions from fathers may be an especially important source of support for these 
families, and may be a much larger proportion of total support received than that for previously 
married families. 
Using data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, we describe the 
package of support (formal, informal, and noncash) that nonresident fathers provide for their 
children, and estimate the effect of child support enforcement on each type of support, and most 
importantly, on the total amount of cash support received. We find that three years after the birth 
                                                 
1 Because 86% of single-parent families are made up of a custodial mother and nonresident 
father, for the remainder of the paper we will refer to them in this way.  
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of a nonmarital child, informal support is more common and larger in dollar amounts than is 
formal support. Strong enforcement reduces the amount of informal support, increases the 
amount of formal support, and most importantly, has almost no effect on the total amount of 
support received by unwed mothers. However, the results differ substantially by when parents 
stopped cohabiting, with negative effects on total payments for parents who stopped cohabiting 
recently and positive effects for parents who never cohabited or stopped cohabiting three or more 
years ago.  
 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS  
Weiss and Willis (1985) present a theory of children as collective goods, arguing that because a 
father cannot monitor how money is spent in the mother’s household, he will voluntarily 
contribute less than is optimal. Similarly, Graham and Beller (2002), modeling child support 
payments as a classic ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ outcome, predict non-optimal outcomes. In this 
game, although a cooperative equilibrium produces the highest utility for both parents and the 
highest level of spending for the child, a non-cooperative (low-spending) equilibrium is actually 
achieved because of parents’ mistrust. Building on both these perspectives, Argys and Peters 
(2003) present a model where parents are able to achieve a cooperative equilibrium if the father 
can observe the children’s well-being through regular contact with them.  
While granting that the amount of support fathers can provide is related to their ability to 
pay (e.g. earnings), these theories emphasize the importance of taking into account fathers’ 
willingness to pay child support on a voluntary basis, and provide a rationale for government 
intervention to require child support payments that exceed what some fathers would be willing to 
pay voluntarily. Though none of the theories systematically addresses the effects of strong child 
     5
support enforcement on informal and total child support payments, this is easily done with a few 
simple extensions.
2 Assume that at a point in time, all noncustodial fathers fall somewhere along 
a distribution of their willingness (holding constant their ability) to pay. Without child support 
enforcement (at each given level of ability to pay), some fathers will informally contribute more 
than they may be required to or at just the amount they would be required to, while others 
contribute less than what they may be required to or will contribute nothing. The effects of 
enforcement differ for these two groups of fathers. In the presence of a child support 
enforcement system, fathers who were paying exactly what they needed to, will switch the 
required amount from informal to formal support. Amongst the group of fathers who were 
paying more, some, perhaps most, will continue to make up the difference with informal support. 
But some fathers who were paying more would interpret the new guidelines as maximums and 
feel justified in reducing their payments. In short, for fathers who voluntarily pay as much or 
more than required by law, strong child support enforcement will substantially reduce the 
amount of informal support, substantially increase the amount of formal support, and reduce by a 
relatively small amount the total amount contributed. 
Amongst fathers who are paying less than they should, child support enforcement should 
decrease informal payments and increase formal payments by a greater amount than the decrease 
in informal payments. Fathers with formal child support obligations will shift whatever informal 
                                                 
2 Although Argys and Peters (2003) estimate the effect of strict enforcement on voluntary 
contributions from noncustodial parents, these voluntary contributions are based on cooperative 
divorce agreements (those that were not court-ordered). This type of contribution is quite 
different from the informal contributions made by fathers with nonmarital births, the group in 
which we are interested. 
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support they were previously providing into formal support, decreasing the amount of informal 
support and increasing the amount of formal and total support. For fathers not yet subject to a 
formal child support obligation, however, the mother can use the formal system as a bargaining 
tool with which to induce the father to cooperate by contributing more informally or in other 
ways (help with child care or visitation), thereby increasing informal and total support (England 
and Folbre 2002). In this one case, strong child support enforcement could increase informal 
support. But, it is safe to assume that the substitution of formal for informal support will dwarf 
this positive effect. Moreover, even in this case, total support should increase. 
Without knowledge of the underlying distribution of fathers’ willingness to voluntarily 
pay child support, it is impossible to predict a priori the effects of enforcement on total child 
support payments. Though every state in the country has long standing laws requiring child 
support payments which have been strengthened substantially in the last 30 years, less than half 
of non-resident fathers paid any formal child support in any year (Roberts 2000; U.S. Census 
Bureau 2003). Although some proportion of this payment gap is due to low-income fathers’ 
inability to pay support (Garfinkel, McLanahan and Hanson 1998; Mincy and Sorensen 1998; 
Waller and Plotnick 2001); it seems reasonable to conclude that only a minority of fathers are 
willing to pay as much or more than the amount they are paying, or would be formally required 
to pay, and that the majority of fathers are willing to pay less. This suggests that strong 
enforcement should increase total payments. But, it is possible that inability to pay, not 
unwillingness to pay, accounts for the formal payment gap; in which case strong enforcement 
may not increase total payments and, for reasons discussed below, might actually lead to 
decreases in total payments.  
     7
Though the net effect of strong enforcement on total child support is ambiguous,  
research suggests that non-resident fathers’ willingness to pay child support decreases over time, 
which in turn implies that the effects of strong enforcement on total payments will increase over 
time (Beller and Graham 1993; Seltzer, Schaeffer and Charng 1989).  As recent research from 
Fragile Families data has shown (Carlson, McLanahan and England 2004), the relationships of 
new unmarried parents are quite dynamic and heterogeneous. At birth, half of these parents were 
cohabiting, 30% were still romantically involved though living apart, and 20% were no longer 
romantically involved (McLanahan et al. 2001). Approximately one year later, 15% of the 
cohabitors have married and 25% have split up, while 37% of the romantically involved have 
moved to cohabitation or marriage, and nearly half have split up (Carlson et al. 2004). Once the 
cohabiting or romantic relationship ends, most fathers and mothers move on to other 
relationships and many bear new children. The new relationships, and especially the new 
children, decrease the father’s willingness to pay informal child support because he will be more 
interested in providing for his new children and because he will be less interested in providing 
support to the mother’s household in the presence of her new partner or new children which are 
not his. As willingness to pay decreases, the effect of strong enforcement on total payments 
increases.  In the extreme case, when willingness to pay and informal payments reach zero, 
strong enforcement can have only a positive effect on total payments.  
One other reason to expect that the net effect of child support enforcement will increase 
over time comes from the Weiss and Willis argument that fathers may increase payments if they 
can monitor how they are spent. If fathers are required to pay more child support than they would 
voluntarily, they are likely to exert more effort to monitor the payments.  As fathers increase 
visitation, they may increase payments, which may further increase visitation, and so on. A 
     8
number of studies have examined the relationship between payments and contact and have found 
a positive association between these behaviors (though see Del Boca and Ribero 2001 for an 
opposing view; McLanahan et al. 1994; Nepomnyaschy 2007; Peters et al. 2004; Seltzer, 
McLanahan and Hanson 1998; Seltzer et al. 1989; Sorensen and Pomper 2003; Veum 1993).  
But, strong child support enforcement could actually lower child support payments in the 
short run by encouraging mothers to pursue formal rather than informal support. Once a mother 
pursues a father for child support through the formal system, fathers may continue to pay 
informally if their relationship with the mother remains amicable. For those with non-amicable 
relations, informal support will end or already have ended, and formal support will not yet have 
started, leading to a temporary decline in total support. The lag between application for formal 
support and receipt of it can be quite lengthy, entailing establishing paternity-if not previously 
established, obtaining an order, and securing a payment on the order.  
In sum, although theory provides no clear prediction about the effects of strong child 
support enforcement on total child support payments, based on the above discussion, we expect 
that the longer the time period since parents have stopped cohabiting, the greater will be the shift 
from informal to formal support and the stronger will be the positive effect of enforcement on 
total child support received.  
The literature describes several other factors that can affect fathers’ willingness to pay 
child support.  First, fathers will be less willing to pay child support if their children are 
receiving public assistance. In most states (30), child support paid on behalf of mothers on 
welfare is kept by the state in order to recoup public costs; in the rest of the states some portion 
(the first $50 or more) of the payment is passed through to the mother (Roberts and Vinson 
2004). Therefore, in general, fathers have less incentive to pay child support through the formal 
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system if mothers are on welfare because it is unlikely that their children will benefit from these 
payments. Second, fathers who have lived with the mother and child are likely to have a stronger 
attachment to the child and therefore a greater willingness to pay.  Finally, it is important to note 
that fathers with ties to the regular labor market have much less discretion in whether or how 
much child support to pay, because their support obligation is automatically withheld from 
wages (Bartfeld and Meyer 2003). These fathers may only reveal their willingness or 
unwillingness to pay support by reducing or terminating their participation in regular 
employment.  
Several studies have described the prevalence of informal and in-kind support from 
fathers (Greene and Moore 2000; Meyer and Cancian 2001; Miller and Knox 2001; Nord and 
Zill 1996; Roberts 2000; Seltzer and Schaeffer 2001; Teachman 1991), but only a few have 
examined the relationship between formal and informal support. Data from the Parents’ Fair 
Share demonstration, focusing on low-income fathers, provide evidence of a substitution effect 
between formal and informal support, with fathers who are forced to pay formally decreasing 
their informal contributions (Miller and Knox 2001). Other evidence suggests that fathers who 
are paying formally or who have a child support order contribute more informal or in-kind 
support  than those who do not (Meyer and Cancian 2001; Roberts 2000; Seltzer and Schaeffer 
2001; Teachman 1991). Two of these studies (Meyer & Cancian and Seltzer & Schaeffer) were 
based on samples of mothers on public assistance and the fathers associated with them, who are 
presumably also low-income. However, it is still possible that those fathers who were 
contributing both formally and informally were those with more stable and better paying jobs or 
higher willingness to pay child support.  
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Findings from a number of other qualitative studies of low-income fathers reveal that 
these men have many barriers to contributing child support through the formal system, but 
contribute informally to their children whenever they can (Edin 1995; Furstenberg Jr., Sherwood 
and Sullivan 1992; Magnuson 2006; Pate 2002; Pate 2006; Waller and Plotnick 2001). These 
studies suggest that low-income fathers (and mothers) prefer informal contributions to those 
made through the formal system because the former go directly to their children. This appears to 
be true even when fathers are aware of the penalties associated with non-payment of their formal 
obligations (Pate 2006). 
Though there is ample empirical evidence that strong child support enforcement is 
associated with increases in formal child support payments (Beller and Graham 1993; Freeman 
and Waldfogel 2001; Garfinkel and Klawitter 1990; Garfinkel and Robins 1994; Meyer et al. 
1996; Miller and Garfinkel 1999; Sorensen and Hill 2004), none of these studies examined the 
effect of enforcement on informal or non-cash payments. Furthermore, because much of the 
above research was done on samples dominated by previously-married parents or those whose 
cohabiting or romantic relationships ended some time ago, even less is known about the effects 
of enforcement for unmarried parents with young children.  
We contribute to prior literature in this area in several ways. First, we use a new data 
source, the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Survey to examine the total child support 
package (formal and informal cash, and in-kind support) of parents with recent nonmarital births. 
Unwed parenthood has not been the focus of most prior research, but is now the predominant 
form of single-parent family (U.S. Census Bureau 2004). Second, the timing of the Fragile 
Families study allows for the assessment of (though not changes in) behavioral effects after the 
passage of the 1996 welfare reform bill, which specifically focused on increasing formal 
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financial contributions to nonmarital children. Third, and most important, we estimate, for the 
first time, the effects of child support enforcement on all forms of child support.    
 
DATA 
This research uses the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study which examines the 
conditions and capabilities of new unwed mothers and fathers and the wellbeing of their 
children. The baseline data, collected between 1998 and 2000, consist of 4898 births (3711 
unwed and 1187 marital) in 75 hospitals in 20 U.S. cities
3 (15 states) with populations of 
200,000 or more. The data are representative of unwed births in each of the cities sampled. 
Mothers and fathers were interviewed in the hospital shortly after their child’s birth, with follow-
up interviews when the child was one, three and five years old. For a detailed discussion of the 
Fragile Families study design, see Reichman et al (2001). In this paper, we use the first three 
waves of data, which are hereafter referred to as the baseline, one-year and three-year follow-up 
surveys, respectively.  
Approximately 3,200 mothers with nonmarital births were re-interviewed at the three-
year follow-up. 42% or 1,331 of these mothers were cohabiting with the father of the focal child 
at the time of the three-year survey and were excluded. Although some cohabiting fathers have 
child support orders (if the mother received public assistance or if they were separated 
previously), we choose to exclude this group from our analyses because cohabiting mothers are 
                                                 
3 The following 20 cities in 15 states are included in the survey: Oakland, San Jose (CA); Austin, 
Corpus Christi, San Antonio (TX): Richmond, Norfolk (VA); Philadelphia, Pittsburgh (PA); 
Newark (NJ); New York (NY); Nashville (TN); Toledo (OH); Milwaukee (WI); Chicago (IL); 
Indianapolis (IN); Jacksonville (FL); Baltimore (MD); and Detroit (MI). 
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not asked about informal contributions from fathers.
4 Due to this lack of information, we cannot 
observe the effect of enforcement on the total amount of support that cohabiting fathers provide 
to their children. We also limit our analyses to 18 (out of 20) cities due to data limitations. In the 
first two cities, Oakland, CA and Austin, TX, mothers who reported having a child support order 
were mistakenly skipped out of all questions regarding informal contributions. This omission 
was fixed in interviews in the subsequent 18 cities. Because our primary goal in this paper is to 
understand the effect of enforcement on the total package of support that mothers receive, we 
exclude 241 observations from these two cities. We also excluded 30 mothers who reported that 
the father was deceased or unknown.  From this sample of 1577 mothers, 228 observations were 
dropped due to missing data on the dependent variables and 26 observations were dropped due to 
missing data on covariates (only for variables that were missing fewer than 10 cases).  In order to 
minimize further data loss, for variables that had more than 10 missing cases, we created missing 
variable indicators and these dummy flags were included in the regressions. The main analyses 
in this paper are based on data from 1,326 mothers with a nonmarital birth who were not 
cohabiting with the father (of the focal child) at the time of the 3-year survey.  
We rely solely on mothers’ reports about fathers’ characteristics and contributions.  This 
choice presents a trade-off between two types of biases, non-response bias due to missing fathers 
and measurement error due to mothers’ potential underreporting of fathers’ contributions.  
Although the Fragile Families study identified and interviewed a very large proportion of unwed 
fathers as compared with other national surveys, still about 25% of these fathers were not 
interviewed at the baseline survey.  These missing fathers are more likely to be disadvantaged 
                                                 
4 Only 10% of fathers who were cohabiting with the mother at the 3-year survey have a child 
support order and 7% of cohabiting fathers have made a formal payment in the past year. 
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and in less committed relationships with the mothers at birth (Teitler, Reichman and Sprachman 
2003).  Therefore focusing only on fathers who were interviewed would introduce substantial 
non-response bias.  On the other hand, mothers may underestimate the level of child support 
received from the father, especially if they are on public assistance. Because of the high response 
rates for mothers, the lower likelihood of systematic differences between interviewed and non-
interviewed mothers and because mothers are asked detailed questions about fathers, we choose 
to focus on mothers’ reports in these analyses. 
Outcome Measures 
We measure several types of contributions that fathers make to their 3-year old children: formal 
child support, which is received through an established child support order; informal cash 
support, which includes any other financial contributions made outside the formal system; total 
cash support, which is the sum of the two above; and non-cash contributions, referred to as in-
kind support. Mothers are asked how much formal and informal cash support the father has paid 
in the past twelve months. Mothers, who were not able to provide the exact amount of child 
support in the first question, were then asked a follow up question consisting of seven ranges of 
payments. We assigned the midpoint of the following ranges for these mothers and included 
these amounts in the continuous measures of support received: <$500; $500-$1000; $1001-
$2000; $2001-$3000; $3001-$4000; $4001-$5000; $5001-$10,000; and >$10,000. This was 
done for 4% (51) of mothers for formal support and 9% (115) of mothers for informal support. 
We created dichotomous measures for any informal and any formal support from these 
continuous variables if they were greater than zero. For the total amount of cash support received 
by mothers, we add the formal and informal amounts for the continuous measure and create a 
dichotomous variable if this amount is greater than zero.  
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Mothers are asked how often in the past year father has purchased clothes, toys, 
medicine, food or anything else for the child, with possible responses of: ‘often, sometimes, 
rarely or never’. Food was the most commonly reported item purchased ‘often’ by fathers (18%), 
as opposed to medicine (12%), clothes (15%), toys (13%), and other items (8%). We create a 
dichotomous measure for whether the mother received in-kind contributions from the father if 
she responded ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ to any of the above items. We based this cutoff on the 
distribution of responses in our data: approximately one-third of mothers reported that the father 
provided each of these things often or sometimes, as opposed to only 15% reporting fathers 
buying these things often. All of these outcome variables are measured at one point in time, at 
the three-year survey. 
Child Support Enforcement 
In this paper, the strength of child support enforcement is based on city-level child support 
outcomes from the 2000 Census. Our measure is a ratio of the likelihood of receiving child 
support to the predicted likelihood of receiving child support in a given city adjusted for a 
number of individual and city-level characteristics.  More specifically, using a 5% sample from 
the Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) from the 2000 Census, we made an extract of never-
married mothers in the 20 cities that are represented in the Fragile Families data. From this 
dataset, a variable for whether the mother received any child support was created.
5 This measure 
                                                 
5 The Census does not specifically ask about child support income. We proxy child support 
income with the “other income” category in the Census. Creating a similar category in the SIPP 
data, we calculated that over 90 percent of “other income” for unmarried mothers consists of 
child support payments. Therefore, we feel confident that the “other income” category is an 
acceptable child support proxy for this group of mothers. 
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represents the likelihood that an average unmarried mother in that city receives child support; 
however, it may not be a good indicator of the strength of enforcement in that city, since it may 
be strongly associated with the demographic composition of the city. For example, cities with 
higher proportions of low-income families will have worse child support outcomes than cities 
with more advantaged populations, and these differences may be unrelated to the vigor of the 
child support enforcement system. Similarly, the likelihood of receiving child support in a given 
city may be associated with the strength of the labor market in that city. Therefore, we adjust the 
raw child support payment rate with a number of individual and city-level characteristics.  
We regress the dichotomous variable for whether a mother had a child support payment 
on the mother’s race/ethnicity, age, education, nativity, number of children, presence of child 
under age 6, state-level median male wage and maximum combined TANF/Food Stamp benefit. 
From this equation, we predict an aggregate city-level probability of receiving support, and 
divide the raw aggregate probability of receiving support by this adjusted measure. We 
standardize this ratio (convert to a z-score) so that a unit change represents a change of one 
standard deviation.  Finally, this city-level aggregate measure is appended to the individual-level 
data by city of mothers’ residence. 
We believe this measure of actual to expected child support outcomes is the best single 
measure of the strength of child support enforcement because it encompasses not only the 
interaction of the strength of child support laws and fiscal effort to enforce the laws, but also the 
efficacy of city practices and the competence of the city bureaucracy in implementing the laws. 
States may be leaders in passing child support legislation, but it is possible that these laws are not 
actually enforced. Expenditures may be a good measure of a state’s commitment to enforcement, 
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but states with the worst collection rates may need to spend the most to improve their outcomes. 
Most prior studies have used state-level measures of enforcement. While legislation and 
expenditures are state-level indicators, implementation of laws happens at the local level. 
Therefore, using city-level indicators of the strength of enforcement captures this local variation 
in implementation and creates a more valid measure.  Although our measure of child support 
enforcement has been purged of observed variables that could influence child support payments, 
it is possible that unobserved differences across cities lead to higher child support payments 
rather than the strength of enforcement. For this reason, as a robustness check, we also use a 
more exogenous measure of the strength of child support enforcement which is based on state 
child support policies and state expenditures for child support enforcement. Following Freeman 
and Waldfogel (2001), we use a multiplicative measure of policies and expenditures. The overall 
substantive findings of no effect on total payments are similar, but the findings for time since 
parents stopped cohabiting are not as well ordered.   
Parents’ Relationship  
As discussed previously, we expect that the package of support that mothers receive from fathers 
as well as the effect of enforcement on this support will vary by the length of time since parents 
stopped cohabiting. We divide the full sample of mothers who are not cohabiting with the father 
at the three-year survey into three groups based on the length of time since they stopped 
cohabiting with the father of the focal child: (1) those who were not cohabiting at any of the 
three waves of the survey (baseline, 1-yr or 3-yr); (2) those who were cohabiting at baseline, but 
not at 1-yr or 3-yr; and (3) those who were cohabiting at baseline and 1-yr, but were not 
cohabiting by the 3-yr survey. There are two other groups of mothers whom we include in our 
full sample, but do not examine results for separately: (1) those who were not cohabiting at 
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baseline, cohabiting at 1-yr, and then not cohabiting by 3-year; and (2) those who were not 
interviewed at the 1-yr survey, but were at the other two waves, making it impossible to 
determine when they stopped cohabiting.  
Covariates 
We include a number of father, mother and child characteristics that may be related to fathers’ 
ability and willingness to pay support. These variables are all taken from mothers’ reports from 
the baseline interview, at the time of the child’s birth.
6 First, is a group of basic demographics: 
father’s age, race/ethnicity, education, and mother’s nativity-as a proxy for father’s nativity.  
Based on prior research, we expect that older, more educated, native-born, and white fathers will 
be more able to pay child support (Beller and Graham 1993).   
Next, we include a number of other family characteristics which are important predictors 
of fathers’ willingness and ability to pay support, some of which have not been available in other 
datasets: whether the father contributed cash or in-kind during the pregnancy, whether he visited 
in the hospital, whether the mother wanted him involved, whether he intended to contribute in 
the future, the father’s employment status, whether the father had a work-limiting disability, 
whether he had a problem with drugs or alcohol, whether he was ever in jail or prison, whether 
the parents have other children together, and both parents’ multiple partner fertility. We expect 
that fathers who have other children with this mother, who have not been incarcerated, who are 
employed, who are not disabled, and who exhibited signs of commitment to the child during the 
pregnancy will be more willing and able to contribute financially to their children (Beller and 
                                                 
6 There are three exceptions. Questions about father’s multiple partner fertility and history of 
incarceration are only asked at the 1-year follow-up survey and the child’s age (in months) is 
taken from the 3-year survey. 
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Graham 1993; Lewis, Garfinkel and Gao In press). The expectation for fathers’ multiple partner 
fertility is not clear. On the one hand, fathers who have children with other mothers may have a 
larger child support burden and therefore be less likely to pay. On the other hand, they may be 
more exposed to the child support enforcement system and therefore may be more likely to have 
an order and to be paying (Cancian and Meyer 2005). 
We also include the child’s gender and age at the time of the 3-year interview and three 
measures of parents’ homogamy (the difference in parents’ ages and education levels, and 
whether they are of the same race/ethnicity). We expect that fathers who are more similar to 
mothers on these attributes are more likely to be in more cooperative relationships with the 
mothers and be more willing to contribute to their children (Becker 1981).  Because we are not 
interested in the effect of individual variables, but in controlling for a host of characteristics 
which are related to fathers’ contributions to their children, we are not especially concerned with 
the potential collinearity of some of these variables.  
We also include the unemployment rate in the metropolitan area and the combined 
maximum TANF/Food Stamp benefit in the state, both of which may be related to fathers’ ability 
to pay support and mothers’ need for child support. The metropolitan unemployment rate for 
1999 ranges from 2.2 in Austin to 6.5 in Corpus Christi (U.S. Department of Labor 2002), while 
the 1999 maximum combined TANF and Food Stamp benefit for a family of three ranges from 
$526 in Texas to $907 in Wisconsin (SPDP 2001). We use aggregate city and state measures 
from 1999 because this is the year of the baseline interview for most of the parents in the Fragile 
Families survey.  
METHODS 
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We first describe the prevalence and amount of fathers’ contributions to their 3-year old children 
in the Fragile Families data for the entire sample. As discussed previously, the length of time 
since parents stopped cohabiting should be strongly related to the package of support that 
mothers receive, therefore, we stratify the sample into three groups of mothers based on how 
long they have not been cohabiting. Then, in multivariate analyses, we estimate the effect of 
child support enforcement on the prevalence and amount of all types of fathers’ contributions to 
their children for the full sample, controlling for all the previously described covariates. Models 
for dichotomous outcomes (whether fathers contribute any informal support, any formal support, 
either type of support, or any non-cash support) are estimated with probit regressions. For these 
analyses, marginal effects, evaluated at the means of the independent variables, and z-statistics 
are presented (dprobit command in Stata 9 SE). Models for continuous outcomes (amount of 
informal support, formal support and total support), which are all censored at zero, are estimated 
with tobit regressions and are presented as marginal effects conditional on being uncensored and 
z-statistics (dtobit command in Stata 8 SE). Finally, we interact the child support enforcement 
measure with the 3-level categorical variable representing the length of time since parents 
stopped cohabiting to understand whether the effect of enforcement differs across these groups. 
 
FINDINGS  
Fathers’ Contributions to Children 
Table 1 presents the means of the variables used in our analyses, beginning with the dependent 
variables which describe the prevalence and amount of nonresident fathers’ contributions to their 
children approximately three years after a nonmarital birth. The most important finding is that 
three years after the birth of a nonmarital child, informal support (whether cash or in-kind) is 
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more common and larger in dollar amounts than is formal support. Thus ignoring the effects of 
child support enforcement on informal support is a serious omission. Only 24% of non-resident 
fathers paid formal support, compared to 35% who paid informally, and 44% who provided in- 
kind support. However, the average amount of informal support received by all mothers is only 
slightly larger than the amount of formal support ($508 vs. $421), suggesting that those who do 
receive formal support receive a higher amount (on average) than those who are receiving 
informal support only. Over half (53%) of mothers receive any cash support (formal or 
informal), indicating that only 6% of mothers receive both types of contributions from fathers 
(35% informal + 24% formal = 59% – 53% who receive either = 6%). The figures for formal 
support are quite similar to figures reported by Sorensen and Hill (2004) from the March Current 
Population Survey (CPS) for never-married mothers, while the informal and non-cash figures are 
on par with those reported by Seltzer and Schaeffer (2001) based on data from the Wisconsin 
Child Support Demonstration Evaluation (CSDE).  
Sample Description 
The majority of mothers (56%) who are not cohabiting with the father of the focal child at the 3-
year survey have never cohabited with him (at none of the waves). A small proportion (16%) 
were cohabiting at the time of the child’s birth, but then broke up before the 1-year survey; and a 
smaller proportion (13%) were cohabiting at baseline and the 1-year survey, but then broke up by 
the 3-year survey. The mothers in our sample have had children with fathers who are mostly like 
themselves--non-white (68% non-Hispanic black, and 20% Hispanic), young (78% under 30) 
and relatively poorly educated (38% have not completed high school) fathers. Over half (51%) of 
these fathers and 40% of the mothers have prior children with other people. Only 71% of the 
fathers were working at the time of the child’s birth and 45% have spent some time in jail or 
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prison. However, an overwhelming majority of the fathers contributed cash during the pregnancy 
(73%), visited in the hospital (66%) and intended to contribute to the child in the future (86%). 
Most notably, 92% of the mothers wanted the father involved with the child at the time of the 
birth. These parents faced a relatively low average metropolitan unemployment rate of 3.8% and 
the average maximum combined TANF/Food Stamp benefit was $716.  
Informal and Formal Child Support Receipt 
Table 2 presents figures for the proportion of mothers with in-kind and informal support and the 
amount of informal support received across various groups: column 1 is for all mothers, column 
2 is for those with orders (58% of full sample), column 3 is for those with no orders (42%), 
column 4 is for those with a formal payment (58% of those with orders), and column 5 is for 
those with orders but no formal payments (42% of those with orders). The top panel is for all 
mothers, while the subsequent panels disaggregate these mothers into three groups by the length 
of time since they stopped cohabiting with the father. Tests of significance indicate whether 
differences in informal and non-cash receipt are statistically significant between those with and 
without orders and formal payments; and between the second two groups of mothers (those who 
stopped cohabiting between baseline and 1-yr and those who stopped cohabiting between 1-year 
and 3-year) and the first group (who never cohabited).  
The second panel, column 1, indicates that, for the most part, mothers who have not been 
cohabiting with the father for the longest time (at none of the waves), are less likely to receive 
in-kind (36% vs. 63%) and informal support (31% vs. 50%) and receive less informal support 
($396 vs. $725) than mothers who have stopped cohabiting more recently (bottom panel). This 
pattern holds true especially for mothers without a child support order (2
nd column).  
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Comparing mothers with and without child support orders (top panel: 2
nd and 3
rd 
columns), mothers without child support orders are more likely to get in-kind (48% vs. 39%) and 
informal (43% vs. 24%) support and a much higher amount of informal support ($754 vs. $162) 
than mothers with child support orders. This pattern holds across the three groups of mothers, 
though not all the differences are statistically significant. This finding is expected, since we 
believe that mothers will pursue fathers through the formal system when fathers stop or decrease 
their informal contributions. Following this argument, we would also expect that mothers who 
have been nonresident the shortest time would be less likely to have a child support order. 
Italicized figures from the 3
rd column (bottom panel) show that only 34% of mothers who 
stopped cohabiting between the 1 and 3-yr surveys have an order as compared to 52% of mothers 
who stopped cohabiting between baseline and 1-yr (3
rd panel). However, this pattern does not 
hold for those who have never cohabited, with only 45% of these mothers having a child support 
order (2
nd panel). The difference between those who ever and never cohabited probably reflects a 
greater commitment to the mother and/or child amongst fathers who ever cohabited. 
Next we examine formal payments amongst those with a child support order and compare 
informal contributions from fathers by whether they have made a formal payment (4
th and 5
th 
columns). First, over half the mothers with an order (58% – top row) have received a formal 
payment in the past year. Contrary to expectations, the proportion of mothers who receive formal 
payments (given an order) increases as the time from break-up decreases (italicized figures in 
column 4). 65% of those who stopped cohabiting between 1-year and 3-year received a formal 
payment as compared with 56% of those who never cohabited with the father, though these 
differences are not statistically significant at conventional levels. As mentioned previously, these 
mothers are also the most likely to be receiving informal contributions from the father (either in 
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cash or in-kind). Perhaps these fathers, who have been cohabiting with mothers the longest time 
(at least 1 year since the child’s birth), are a more select group of fathers, who are more willing 
and able to contribute to their children in a number of ways. 
Mothers who receive formal payments (across all groups) are more likely to also receive 
in-kind and informal cash support and receive a larger amount of informal support than mothers 
who do not receive a formal payment from fathers. On the one hand, we would expect fathers 
who pay formally to have fewer resources left over to contribute informally. On the other hand, 
once there is a child support order, perhaps fathers who comply with that order are more 
committed fathers and have better relationships with the mothers of their children and therefore 
are more willing to contribute in both ways; or perhaps these fathers are in more stable, better 
paying jobs and are more able to contribute in both ways. However, it is important to note again 
that the group of mothers who receive both formal and informal contributions is actually quite 
small. From Table 1, only 24% of mothers in the full sample receive formal support, and from 
Table 2, of those receiving formal support, 26% are also receiving informal. This amounts to 
only 6% (24 * .26) of the full sample receiving both formal and informal support. Finally, 
mothers who have a child support order but have no formal support receive the least support for 
their children, both in informal cash and non-cash support, from fathers. These fathers, within 
each group, may be the most financially disadvantaged and may be the least connected to their 
children. 
Multivariate Analyses 
In this section, we estimate the effect of child support enforcement on informal, formal and total 
cash contributions and non-cash contributions received by mothers. Our a priori expectations are 
that strong enforcement should increase formal support, decrease informal and non-cash support, 
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but have an ambiguous effect on total support received from fathers. The effect of enforcement 
on total support, however, should become increasingly positive as the length of the post 
cohabitation period increases.  
In Table 3, we examine the effect of child support enforcement on child support 
outcomes for the full sample of mothers not cohabiting with the father at the 3-year survey. We 
present full models for the association of our child support enforcement measure (city-level 
adjusted payment ratio) and four child support outcomes. Because the child support enforcement 
measure is converted to a z-score, the interpretation of the coefficient is the change in the 
dependent variable associated with a 1 standard deviation increase on the payment ratio. Mothers 
who live in a city that is one standard deviation above the mean on the payment ratio receive 
approximately $40 less in informal support, and approximately $80 more in formal support than 
those who live in a city at the mean. These offsetting effects lead to no increase (or decrease) in 
the total amount of support that mothers receive (coefficient is positive, but not at all significant). 
However, these mothers are also 3 percentage points less likely to receive any non-cash support 
from fathers. Thus strong enforcement leads to a smaller total package of support received by 
mothers.  
As expected, the length of time since parents stopped cohabiting is an important predictor 
of the types of support that mothers receive from fathers. Compared with the group of mothers 
who stopped cohabiting with the father most recently (between 1-year and 3-year), those who 
have not been cohabiting longer (never cohabited and broke up between baseline and 1-year) 
receive much less informal support ($191 and $206, respectively) and are both 13 percentage 
points less likely to receive non-cash support from fathers, controlling for all covariates. But 
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these two groups also receive much more formal support ($231 and $314) than those who 
stopped cohabiting more recently.  
Although the focus of our paper is the relationship between enforcement and fathers’ 
contributions, we also discuss some of the other characteristics that are significantly associated 
with fathers’ contributions. Fathers who are black (not quite significant), contributed cash during 
the pregnancy, have not spent time in jail and who do not have children with other women 
contribute more informal cash support when their children are three years old than fathers who 
are white, did not contribute during the pregnancy, have been in jail, and have children with 
other mothers. The predictors of formal support payment are quite different. White (vs. black or 
Hispanic), older, and more educated fathers are more likely to contribute formally. Fathers who 
visited in the hospital, those who worked at baseline, those who had no incarceration history, and 
those whom the mother wanted involved in the child’s life were also more likely to contribute 
formally.  
Fathers who contributed during the pregnancy, visited in the hospital, did not have 
children with other mothers, and did not have a history of incarceration were more likely to 
contribute non-cash support when the child was three years old. The only characteristic of fathers 
that was predictive of formal, informal, and non-cash support was fathers’ incarceration history. 
These fathers contributed much less cash ($199 informal, $209 formal, and $321 total) and were 
much less likely to contribute in-kind (14 percentage points) than were fathers who had no 
history of incarceration. The maximum TANF/Food Stamp benefit in the state was positively 
associated with non-cash support, but negatively associated with formal cash support from 
fathers. One possible explanation is that mothers in more generous states might be less inclined 
to pursue fathers for formal support; therefore fathers are more likely to contribute informally. 
     26
Another possible explanation may be that more generous states are also less stringent in child 
support enforcement, though because we control for strength of enforcement, that explanation 
seems less likely. Finally, if more generous states are also those with higher costs of living, then 
perhaps fathers in these states have a harder time paying formally, but are able to contribute 
informally.  
Table 4 examines the association between enforcement and the contributions that fathers 
make to their children over time. Each cell represents a separate regression controlling for all the 
previously discussed covariates, but only the figures for the noted variables are shown. The first 
panel presents results for the full sample, repeating the coefficients for amount of informal, 
formal and total support, and probability of in-kind support from Table 4. Three additional 
binary outcomes for any informal, any formal, and any cash support are also presented in Table 
4; and these results are quite similar to the corresponding continuous outcomes. To summarize 
these findings for the full sample of mothers, we find a weak negative effect of enforcement on 
informal support, a strong positive effect on formal support, and no effect on total support 
received (very weak positive effect on any cash support). 
The second panel presents results from the interaction of enforcement and a measure of 
how long the parents have not been cohabiting. The figures presented are the interaction 
coefficients and z-statistics in parentheses for the first two groups of mothers (never cohabiting 
and stopped cohabiting between baseline and 1-year) and the main effect for the payment rate 
ratio, which is actually the effect of enforcement for the omitted category of mothers (those who 
stopped cohabiting between 1-year and 3-year). The interaction coefficients for the other two 
groups of mothers indicate the magnitude of the difference in the effect of enforcement between 
these two groups and the comparison group. To determine the actual effect of enforcement for 
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these groups, the interaction coefficient must be added to the main effect of enforcement. Z-
statistics of the interaction terms indicate whether the coefficients are significantly different from 
the main effects of enforcement, while z-statistics for the main effects indicate whether the 
coefficients are significantly different from zero. The main effects of time since stopped 
cohabiting and all other covariates are included in the models, but are not presented in this table.   
The effect of enforcement on the likelihood and amount of informal support for the group 
of mothers who have never cohabited (2
nd row) and for those who stopped cohabiting between 
baseline and 1-year (3
rd row) is essentially zero, and these effects are significantly different (just 
short of significance for the 2
nd group) from the effect of enforcement for the group of mothers 
who stopped cohabiting most recently (4
th row). But, for this group that stopped cohabiting most 
recently, there is a strong negative effect of enforcement on informal support.  
As expected, there is a reverse ordering for the effect of enforcement on the likelihood 
and amount of formal support receipt, with an increasingly positive effect of enforcement on 
formal support as the time from break up increases, though these effects are not significantly 
different from each other. Finally and most importantly, looking at the results for any cash and 
the total amount of cash support received, as expected, we find the strongest positive effect of 
enforcement for mothers who have not been cohabiting the longest time and a negative effect for 
those who have stopped cohabiting most recently. And, these differences are, for the most part, 
statistically significant. We also estimated fully interacted models of the effects of enforcement 
by the time since parents stopped cohabiting and got very similar results (results are not shown, 
but are available from authors). 
Robustness Checks 
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Table 5 presents the results of two alternative specifications to test the robustness of our results. 
First, because mothers on welfare must give up rights to child support paid on their behalf, it is 
possible that this group of mothers may be unintentionally misreporting how much formal 
support is received from fathers. If this is true, our results for formal support and therefore total 
support received would be biased. In addition, fathers with children receiving TANF have less 
incentive to pay formal support because the state rather than their child receives the bulk of what 
they pay. Therefore, we estimated models for a subsample of mothers who have never reported 
TANF receipt (at any of the three waves, N = 476), and these results are presented in the second 
row of Table 5 (the first row shows results for all mothers-repeated from Table 4, for 
comparison).  The results are basically identical to those of the whole group.  
Second, as discussed in the data section, because our measure of the strength of child 
support enforcement may be subject to omitted variables bias, we used an alternate measure of 
child support enforcement which is more exogenous. Based on the findings of Freeman and 
Waldfogel (2001), indicating that policies and expenditures on child support must be considered 
together, we create a measure of the interaction of legislation and expenditures. We include the 
following laws in the legislative measure: three laws pertaining to paternity establishment 
(allowing paternity to be established until the child is 18, mandating genetic testing and making 
voluntary paternity conclusive); universal wage withholding; and the three most recent federally 
mandated laws (the New Hires directory, license revocation for nonpayment, and automation). 
For each law, we enter the year that the law became effective in the state, standardize it to have a 
mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, and then invert it, so that the longer the laws have been 
on the books, the greater the value. We use total expenditures on child support in the state for 
1999, as reported by the Office of Child Support Enforcement (U.S. Department of Health and 
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Human Services 2001), divided by the number of single mothers in the state from the 2000 
Census. We then break down each measure into quintiles and create a three-level categorical 
variable, where 3 represents a state that is in the top 2 quintiles on both laws and expenditures, 1 
represents a state that is in the bottom 2 quintiles on both measures, and 2 represents all other 
states. Child support outcomes are regressed on this categorical variable, with the worst-
performing states (coded to 1) as the comparison group. These results are presented in the second 
panel of Table 5. The results for this enforcement measure are quite similar to those based on the 
PUMS payment ratio. Mothers in states with stronger child support enforcement receive less 
informal support, but more formal support than mothers in worse-performing states. Mothers in 
better performing states are no better off in terms of total support received than mothers in the 
worst-performing states, while those in the middle states are slightly worse off than those in the 
worst-performing states (though these results are not quite significant).  
Finally, we collapse this three-level variable into whether states are in the top group or 
not and interact this dummy variable with our measure of the time since parents stopped 
cohabiting (bottom panel of Table 5). These results are similar to our original findings, although 
none of the coefficients are significant and the expected ordering is not quite as clear. We 
attribute this to the fact that these are state measures and are therefore less robust in measuring 
differences in child support enforcement at the city level. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we describe the total package of support (formal, informal, total cash support, and 
non-cash contributions) that mothers with nonmarital births receive from the nonresident fathers 
of their children, and estimate the effect of child support enforcement on these contributions. We 
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find that nearly half of these fathers are providing some form of non-cash assistance on a 
somewhat regular basis (sometimes or often) and over half are providing some form of cash 
support (either informally or through the formal child support system), but only a quarter provide 
any formal support as reported by the mother. That is, informal support is more common and 
more important in dollar terms than formal support.  
We also find that the time since parents’ break up from cohabitation into less intimate 
relationships is a strong predictor of the type of support that mothers receive. Mothers who have 
not been cohabiting with the father since before the child’s birth are the least likely to have 
informal and non-cash support, while those who have stopped cohabiting most recently (since 
the last survey) are the most likely. Conversely, those who stopped cohabiting most recently are 
much less likely to have a formal child support order.  
Our findings confirm that informal support from fathers (whether in cash or in-kind) is 
much more prevalent than formal support and is an important resource for mothers with 
nonmarital births who are not residing with the father of their child. This is true, even among 
mothers who have not been cohabiting with the father for more than three years--since before the 
birth of the child. As discussed previously, the fathers in our data have many barriers to paying 
formal support, such as: low levels of education and high rates of unemployment and prior 
incarceration. In addition, because many of these mothers have received public assistance, there 
is an added disincentive to pay formally, since the child may not directly benefit from these 
payments.  
Srong child support enforcement leads to less informal and non-cash support, but more 
formal support for all unmarried non-cohabiting mothers. These effects on formal and informal 
cash support offset each other, leading to the result that strong enforcement has no effect on the 
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dollar amount of total support received and reduces the total package of support that mothers 
receive. In other words, mothers living in cities with a strong child support enforcement system 
are worse off (in terms of contributions from fathers) than are mothers in less stringent cities. 
However, when we interact the strength of enforcement with a measure of how long the parents 
have been nonresident, the results are quite different. For parents who have not been cohabiting 
for a longer time, strict enforcement is positively associated with total support received. For 
parents who have stopped cohabiting more recently, strict enforcement has a negative association 
with total support. The offsetting effects for these groups are responsible for the lack of effect 
across all nonresident mothers.  
That strong child support enforcement contributes to more total support for mothers who 
have been nonresident for a longer period is in line with our a priori expectations. After a 
cohabiting union dissolves, in the short run, strong enforcement will reduce the amount of 
support that mothers may receive from fathers. However, in the longer run, as the time from 
break up increases, strong child support will increase the financial resources of mothers and their 
children. As mentioned previously, evidence suggests that as time from parents’ break up 
increases, fathers are less likely to be involved in their children’s lives (Mott 1990; Seltzer et al. 
1989). According to theory, this will decrease fathers’ willingness to pay informally, pushing 
more fathers into the formal child support system, which should increase the effect of 
enforcement on formal support and lead to a stronger positive relationship between enforcement 
and total support received by mothers. If our hypothesis is true and our findings hold up, 
eventually, most mothers eligible for child support (those not cohabiting with the father) should 
move into the group which gains the most from a strong enforcement regime.  
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Follow-up research is necessary to explore this hypothesis further. First, the over time 
results are less robust than the average effect. Second, we only have three years of data for these 
families. As more parents become nonresident and the time increases from when they stopped 
cohabiting, we can test whether the effect of enforcement on total support increases. Third, we 
are not able to actually measure outcomes for parents who have had a change in residency status. 
We are only comparing mothers in different groups. Therefore, the mothers in each group may 
be different in other ways which may be affecting their child support outcomes. If our results do 
hold up in subsequent research, then it seems that the child support enforcement system, in the 
longer run, will improve the lives of fragile families, and the policy recommendations would be 
to stay the course. 
However, if the over time findings do not hold up and the effect of strong enforcement 
does not increase the package of support that mothers receive, then the implications for policy 
would be quite different. This finding would suggest that the child support enforcement system 
does not work well for children of unmarried parents (a large proportion of all single-parent 
families), and that substantial adjustments need to be made. Further research is necessary before 
the policy implications become clear.  
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics (unweighted), N = 1326 
 Variable  Percent or Mean +/- SD 
   
Dependent Variables   
In-kind support (provides often or sometimes)   44 
Any informal support  35 
Amount of informal support for all  508 +/- 1636 
Any formal support   24 
Amount of formal support for all  421 +/- 1242 
Any cash support  53 
Amount of total cash support for all  929 +/- 1997 
   
Parents' Relationship   
Were not cohabiting at any wave (baseline, 1-yr or 3-yr)  56 
Stopped cohabiting b/w baseline and 1-yr  16 
Stopped cohabiting  b/w 1yr and 3-yr  13 
Not cohabiting at baseline, cohabited at 1-yr, stopped at 3-yr 
b 10 
Not interviewed at 1-yr 
b 6 
   
Demographics  
Father is less than 21  20 
Father is 21-30  58 
Father is 30+  22 
Father is non-Hispanic white  10 
Father is non-Hispanic black  68 
Father is Hispanic  20 
Father is non-Hispanic other race  2 
Father has less than high school 
a 38 
Father is high school graduate  42 
Father has more than high school  20 
Mother is native-born  94 
   
Other Family Characteristics   
Mother was receiving TANF or Food Stamps at baseline  47 
Age of child at 3-year interview (months)  36.7 +/- 2.4 
Male child  53 
Parents are of same race  86 
Difference in parents' education (F minus M)  .08 +/- 1.0 
Difference in parents' ages (F minus M)  2.7 +/- 5.0 
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Table 1: Continued   
 Variable  Percent or Mean +/- SD 
Father contributed cash during pregnancy  73 
Father contributed other during pregnancy  70 
Father visited in the hospital  66 
Mother wanted father involved at birth 
a 92 
Father intended to contribute at birth 
a 86 
Father worked at baseline 
a  71 
Father has work-limiting disability 
a 7 
Father has alcohol/drug problem 
a 9 
Father has been in jail/prison 
a 45 
Father has children with other mothers 
a 51 
Parents have other children together 
a 24 
Mother has children with other fathers 
a 40 
   
Macroeconomic Variables   
MSA unemployment rate, 1999  3.8 +/- 1.2 
Combined maximum TANF/FS benefit, 1999  716 +/- 114 
     
a These variables were missing more than 10 observations (% missing): father's education (6%), 
father's employment (9%), father's incarceration (9%), father's multiple partner fertility (8%), 
father's disability (5%), father's alcohol/drug problem (3%), mother had other kids w/this father 
(4%), mother had kids with other fathers (5%), whether father intended to contribute in the future 
(1.5%), and whether mother wanted father involved in raising the child (3%). Missing flags were 
created for these observations and included in multivariate regressions. The means presented 
above are based on non-missing cases.  
b  Results for these groups of mothers are not considered separately though they are included in 
all multivariate regressions 
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Table 2:  Informal and In-kind Support by Order, Formal Payment and Parents' Cohabitation Status at the 
3-Year Survey (% or mean $s) 
 
  All 
No Formal 
Order With  Formal  Order 
    





          
All Mothers  (N = 1326)  100%       58%  42%  58%  42% 
          
In-kind contributions  44        48
b 39     48
 b 26 
          
Informal cash support  35        43
 b 24         26  22 
          
$'s of informal support for all  508       754
 b 162 209
 b 97 
          
Never Resided with Father (N = 736)   100%       55%  45%  56%  44% 
          
In-kind contributions  36        37  34      43
 b 23 
          
Informal cash support  31        35
 b 25 26  23 
          
$'s of informal support for all  396  619
 b 125 156  86 
          
Stopped Cohabiting b/w baseline & 1-yr 
(N = 215)  100%       48%  52%  63%  37% 
          
In-kind contributions  44
a      50
 a 38   47
 b 24 
          
Informal cash support  29  44
 b 16 20  10 
          
$'s of informal support for all  583    1096
 b a 122 143  85 
          
Stopped Cohabiting b/w  1-yr & 3-yr (N = 
169 )  100%       66%  34%
 a 65% 35% 
          
In-kind contributions  63
 a       67
 a 54
 a 62
 a 40 
          
Informal cash support  50
 a 59
 b a 30 30  30 
          
$'s of informal support for all  725
 a     962
 b 250 330  101 
          
a Means for mothers who stopped cohabiting b/w baseline & 1-yr and b/w 1-yr and 3-yr are significantly 
different from those of mothers who never cohabited at p < .05. 
b Means for mothers with orders and with formal payments are significantly different from those of 
mothers without orders and without formal payments (within rows) at p < .05. 
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Adjusted Child Support Payment Ratio  -41       82***  8   -0.03* 
 (1.58)  (3.63)  (0.28)  (2.12) 
        
Parents' Relationship Status (Stopped cohabiting b/w 1-yr and 3-yr = Reference group)   
Not cohabiting at any wave    -191*    231*  -4    -0.13** 
 (2.15)  (2.72)  (0.04)  (2.72) 
Stopped cohabiting between baseline and 1-yr    -206*     314**  78    -0.13** 
 (2.05)  (3.46)  (0.70)  (2.60) 
        
Demographics        
Father is 21-30  -41  67  79  -0.03 
 (0.49)  (0.92)  (0.87)  (0.79) 
Father is 30+  65  183†  276*  -0.03 
 (0.55)  (1.77)  (2.14)  (0.49) 
Father is non-Hispanic black  168      -366***   -228*  0.06 
 (1.62)  (4.61)  (2.14)  (1.11) 
Father is Hispanic  70  -177†  -143  0.03 
 (0.57)  (1.81)  (1.11)  (0.49) 
Father is non-Hispanic other race  188  -117  27  0.06 
 (0.82)  (0.61)  (0.11)  (0.47) 
Father is high school graduate  58  61  99  -0.02 
 (0.79)  (0.92)  (1.22)  (0.53) 
Father has more than high school  120   209*     370**  -0.05 
 (1.23)  (2.44)  (3.45)  (0.92) 
Mother is native-born  -85  177  40  0.08 
 (0.67)  (1.40)  (0.29)  (1.28) 
        
Other Family Characteristics         
Mother received TANF since baseline  -70  -2  -107  0.03 
 (1.17)  (0.04)  (1.60)  (0.85) 
Age of child at 3-yr interview  -2   -23†  -15  0.00 
 (0.16)  (1.94)  (1.11)  (0.49) 
Male child  -69  36  -29  0.00 
 (1.23)  (0.73)  (0.47)  (0.02) 
Parents are of same race  97  -114  1  0.07 
 (1.10)  (1.58)  (0.01)  (1.47) 
Difference in parents' education (F minus M)  23   -69†  -52  0.04† 
 (0.57)  (1.94)  (1.16)  (1.85) 

















        
Difference in parents' ages (F minus M)  5  -10  -3  0.00 
 (0.82)  (1.63)  (0.39)  (0.20) 
Father contributed cash during pregnancy    207*  -87  65     0.15** 
 (2.20)  (1.10)  (0.65)  (3.26) 
Father contributed other during pregnancy  88  0  41   0.10* 
 (0.97)  (0.00)  (0.42)  (2.17) 
Father visited in the hospital  24   171*   156†  0.06 
 (0.32)  (2.49)  (1.89)  (1.59) 
Mother wanted father involved at birth  102   314*   386*  0.12 
 (0.69)  (2.28)  (2.41)  (1.63) 
Father intended to contribute at birth  73  -101  -74  -0.07 
 (0.64)  (1.05)  (0.62)  (1.13) 
Father worked at baseline  -84   139*  20  0.02 
 (1.23)  (2.15)  (0.26)  (0.48) 
Father has work-limiting disability  -63  -39  -107  0.06 
 (0.52)  (0.36)  (0.80)  (0.89) 
Father has alcohol/drug problem  -6  -25  -41  -0.03 
 (0.05)  (0.25)  (0.33)  (0.56) 
Father has been in jail/prison    -199**      -209***      -321***      -0.14*** 
 (3.04)  (3.66)  (4.52)  (4.23) 
Father has children with other mothers   -140*  13   -129†      -0.12*** 
 (2.14)  (0.23)  (1.79)  (3.66) 
Parents have other children together 34  -64  -39  -0.01 
 (0.49)  (1.01)  (0.49)  (0.35) 
Mother has children with other fathers  -3  -79  -79  0.02 
 (0.04)  (1.34)  (1.10)  (0.70) 
        
Macroeconomic Variables         
MSA unemployment rate, 1999   9  17  19  -0.02 
 (0.34)  (0.73)  (0.65)  (1.17) 
32   -44†  0   0.03*  Combined max TANF/FS benefit, 1999 
($100's) (1.15)  (1.81)  (0.01)  (2.23) 
          
 
a Figures are marginal effects conditional on being uncensored computed from Tobit coefficients and (z-
statistics).     
b Figures are marginal effects calculated at the mean of the independent variables from probit 
coefficients and (z-statistics).   
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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Non-Interacted  Models         
Child Support Enforcement (Adjusted Payment Ratio)  -0.01  -41   0.05***     82***  0.03*  8  -0.03* 
 (0.80)  (1.58)  (4.63)  (3.63)  (1.97)  (0.28)  (2.12) 
         
Interaction of Enforcement and Time Since Stopped Cohabiting               
Not cohabiting at all 3 waves   0.07*   110†   0.01  2.7     0.10** 122†   0.05† 
 (2.35)  (1.84)  (0.25)  (0.05)  (2.93)  (1.82)  (1.66) 
         
Stopped cohabiting b/w baseline & 1-yr  0.06  59   0.02  23    0.08*  83  0.02 
 (1.58)  (0.82)  (0.72)  (0.37)  (2.01)  (1.05)  (0.48) 
         
 -0.06*   -117*   0.03  58   -0.05†  -94   -0.07*  Main effect of enforcement = effect of enforcement for 
reference group (stopped cohabiting b/w 1-yr & 3-yr)  (2.16)  (2.09)  (1.37) (1.13)  (1.76)  (1.48)  (2.13) 
         
Figures for dichotomous outcomes are marginal effects from probit regressions. Figures for continuous outcomes are marginal effects 
from Tobit regressions conditional on being uncensored. Z-statistics are in parentheses. Each cell represents a separate regression 
which controls for all previously discussed covariates.  
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Non-Interacted Models            
Adjusted PUMS ratio for all, N = 1326  0.00  -48   0.05**          97*  0.04†  23 -0.03 
 (0.14)  (0.84)  (2.48)  (2.39)  (1.67)  (0.39)  (1.32) 
              
-0.01  -41   0.05***      82***    0.03*  8   -0.03*  Adjusted PUMS ratio for mothers never on TANF,  
     N = 476  (0.80)  (1.58)  (4.63)  (3.63)  (1.97)  (0.28)  (2.12) 
              
Enforcement Measure Incorporating Laws and Expenditures (states in bottom 40% on both are reference group)   
States are in top 40%ile on expenditures and laws  -0.07   -205*   0.10*   159†  0.02  -86  -0.05 
(1.58) (2.07)  (2.20)  (1.77) (0.29)  (0.79)  (1.01) 
 
States are in the middle on either expenditures and laws   -0.09*   -169*   0.03  70  -0.06  -130  -0.03 
(2.48) (2.23)  (0.77)  (0.28) (1.43)  (1.55)  (0.63) 
 
   
Interaction of Laws/Expenditures Enforcement Measure with Time since Parents Stopped Cohabiting    
Not cohabiting at all 3 waves  0.06  -68   -0.03  -97  0.06  -132  0.00 
 (1.54)  (0.32)    (0.31)  (0.50)  (0.53)  (0.56)  (0.03) 
              
Stopped cohabiting b/w baseline & 1-yr  0.19  77    0.09  110  0.17  76  -0.13 
 (1.39)  (0.30)    (0.74)  (0.49)  (1.24)  (0.27)  (0.96) 
              
-0.09  -78    0.08  173  -0.02  59  -0.01  Main effect of enforcement = effect of enforcement for 
reference group (stopped cohabiting b/w 1-yr & 3-yr)  (0.92) (0.40)    (0.88) (0.96) (0.23)  (0.27)  (0.06) 
Figures for dichotomous outcomes are marginal effects from probit regressions. Figures for continuous outcomes are marginal effects from Tobit 
regressions conditional on being uncensored. Z-statistics are in parentheses. Each cell represents a separate regression which controls for all 
previously discussed covariates.  
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
   